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This article challenges suggestions that citizens should accept digital surveillance 
technologies (DSTs) and trade their privacy for better security. Drawing on data from 
nine EU countries, this research shows that citizens’ support for DSTs varies not only 
depending on the way their data are used but also depending on their views of the 
security agency operating them. Using an institutional trustworthiness lens, this research 
investigates three DST cases – smart CCTV, smartphone location tracking, and deep 
packet inspection – that present escalating degrees of privacy risk to citizens. The 
findings show that the perceived benevolence of security agencies is essential to 
acceptability in all three cases. For DSTs with greater privacy risk, questions of 
competence and integrity enter citizens’ assessments. 
Keywords: Security agencies; Institutional trust; Digital surveillance; Quantile 
regression. 
Evidence for Practice 
 Citizens are not necessarily willing to trade privacy for security, as is often assumed.  
 For citizens to accept digital surveillance technologies, these technologies must be 
deployed in ways that reflect benevolence and incorporate community interests.  
 For citizens to accept more intrusive digital surveillance technologies, security 
agencies need to demonstrate integrity and their ability to deliver security benefits. 
 Participatory democratic processes can establish the shared values that underpin the 
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Digital Surveillance Technologies (DSTs) are widely used by security agencies in 
Europe and in the US to fight crime and terror (Bigo 2016). National governments have 
often justified digital surveillance to the public on the basis that it is reasonable to trade 
individual privacy for better national security, dismissing those who oppose DST use as 
having “something to hide” (Solove 2011). This article challenges this assumption using 
an institutional trustworthiness lens. It shows that citizens’ evaluations of DSTs vary not 
only depending on how the DST uses their data but also depending on their views of the 
security agency itself.  
Following recent data breach scandals, public concerns about how security 
agencies generate and use citizens’ data suggest that an investigation of this issue is 
overdue. This article places data use at the heart of its research design, using the concept 
of data vulnerability to distinguish three DST cases: smart CCTV (sCCTV), smartphone 
location tracking (SLT), and deep packet inspection (DPI). Data vulnerability refers to 
the extent to which citizens believe that they will experience harms from how the data 
generated by DSTs are used (Martin, Borah, and Palmatier 2017). Each of the DSTs 
examined presents different levels of data vulnerability. 
This article finds that the three institutional trustworthiness subscales – 
benevolence, competence, and integrity – influence the extent to which citizens support 
or oppose different DSTs, according to the data vulnerabilities they generate. The 
perceived benevolence of security agencies is essential to citizen perceptions of DST 
support in all three cases. For the DSTs that provoke greater data vulnerability (i.e., 
SLT and DPI), questions of competence and integrity enter citizens’ assessments. Those 
who oppose their adoption are particularly concerned about security agencies’ integrity 
(West and Bowman 2016). Quantile regression is used to examine the relationship 










This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
helps unpack the differing views of those who support and those who oppose the 
technologies. Thus the study contributes to earlier research examining citizen support 
for such intrusive technologies (Bromberg, Charbonneau, and Smith 2018) and the 
related ethical issues. 
In addition to these theoretical contributions, the study makes two important 
methodological contributions. First, it demonstrates the utility of quantile regression as 
a way of moving beyond average perceptions to reveal the patterns behind polarized 
views and the factors underpinning them. Second, it responds to the need for increased 
contextual accuracy in trustworthiness research by adopting a between-case 
methodology that distinguishes the cases using the concept of data vulnerability 
(Cvetkovich and Nakayachi 2007).   
The next section establishes the theoretical basis for the study and presents the 
research propositions. The first subsection considers institutional trustworthiness and 
the public acceptance of DSTs, and the second focuses on data vulnerabilities. A section 
on methods follows, detailing the cases, research approach, measures, and participant 
profiles. The last sections discuss the research results and present the implications for 
policy and practice. 
 
Literature Review and Propositions 
All DSTs present security benefits and privacy risks (Siegrist and Cvetkovich 2002). 
This article questions whether the institutional trustworthiness of security agencies 
influences citizen support of DSTs given these benefits and risks. The idea of a 
security–privacy trade-off assumes that citizens will accept a DST if they believe the 
security benefits outweigh the privacy risks. A major criticism of this argument is that it 
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enacted social practices emerging from the interaction between people and their social 
and institutional contexts (Dourish and Anderson 2006). Prior empirical studies have 
challenged this assumption and explored its dynamics (Pavone and Degli-Esposti 2012; 
van den Broek et al. 2017; Cayford, Pieters, and van Gelder 2019). These studies show 
that the public does not engage in a trade-off, but rather expects the proposed solution to 
offer both privacy and security. As part of this assessment, institutional trustworthiness 
plays a key role in raising public support for DSTs, as a recognized component of the 
national security institutional context at a macro level (Ball et al. 2018). The importance 
of building trust in law enforcement agencies and in the intelligence community has 
also been recognized amongst practitioners (Anderson 2015). This study adds to this 
line of inquiry, by shedding light on the contribution of the three subcomponents of 
institutional trustworthiness on public support for using DSTs for national security.  
Institutional trustworthiness refers to beliefs about a third party that facilitate “a 
willingness to depend on [that] party in a situation of risk” (Akter, D'Ambra, and Ray 
2011, 100). This definition suggests that there are two aspects of institutional 
trustworthiness to consider. The first is how the concept’s basis, measured by its three 
subcomponents, varies in its relationship to citizens’ evaluations of different DSTs. The 
second is how the risks associated with DST deployment shape this variation. Using 
concepts from the public administration and organization literature streams to frame the 
citizen–institution relationship in the security domain these two aspects of the research 
question are now considered. 
 
Institutional Trustworthiness and DSTs 
Within the significant corpus of public administration research which addresses trust in 
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not been examined in any detail. Assessing the concept in the context of DST deployment 
frames different DSTs as manifestations of security policy. Conceptually, institutional 
trustworthiness explores the connection between the citizen and the institution, enabling 
citizens to evaluate institutions and what they stand for (Jackson et al. 2012). Such 
evaluations go beyond politically entrenched reactions to particular governments or 
personalities (Levi and Stoker 2000). They are generalized assessments about existing 
authority structures, public policies, or institutional reforms. Citizens’ trustworthiness 
assessments of institutions thus reflect deeply held, long-term beliefs, dissatisfactions, 
or concerns and are based on their experiences of the political system of which they are 
a part.  
Examining the relationship between DST deployment and the trustworthiness of 
security agencies helps indicate the bases on which citizens deem DSTs and, thus, 
security policy acceptable. This is important for two reasons. First, assessments of low 
trustworthiness arising from the use of intrusive DSTs have the potential to undermine 
not only citizens’ perceived security and safety but also the functioning of national 
security as a whole. This issue is especially acute following recent surveillance scandals 
and the sheer diversity and opacity of nonstate actors in the “security-industrial 
complex” (White 2012). Second, digital security surveillance targeting particular 
populations is at odds with conceptions of national security as a public good that 
benefits all in society and on which many other governance systems rest (Loader and 
Walker 2007).  
Although public administration scholars have not specifically focused on security 
agencies, previous research has examined citizens’ perceptions of civil servants’ 
trustworthiness and the effects of trust on public support for public administration 
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for initiatives such as zoning (Cooper, Knotts, and Brennan 2008). Trust between 
citizens and security agencies fosters mutual cooperation and public acceptance of 
DSTs in matters of crime and security. For example, previous studies have 
demonstrated that citizens, including those living in communities from which terrorists 
seek support, are more inclined to cooperate with police officers they perceive to be 
competent, honest, and benevolent (Tyler and Fagan 2008). Thus, citizens assess the 
competence and warmth of bureaucrats and react accordingly (de Boer 2020).  
Other studies, which address citizens’ acceptance of body worn cameras 
(Bromberg, Charbonneau, and Smith 2018) and drones (West and Bowman 2016), show 
that ethical concerns around DSTs trigger demands for reassurance on the 
trustworthiness of DST operators. To be deemed trustworthy, an institution needs to 
show caring commitment to act in the interests of citizens, an ability to do the job well, 
and a capacity to act with integrity. According to Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995), 
benevolence, competence, and integrity are interpreted as three contrasting belief 
systems with which citizens evaluate the trustworthiness of institutions. Exploring how 
each of these belief systems applies to the deployment of DSTs breaks important new 
ground in the study of national security.  
Benevolence. Benevolence-based trustworthiness assessments are premised on the 
public’s belief that the security agency understands the community it is serving and is 
willing to act in its interests (Tyler 2005). In this sense, the DST is deployed to protect 
all in society, however defined. In law enforcement research, for example, this 
normative belief system is founded on a collective understanding of group interests and 
a shared commitment to social order between citizens and police, which motivates 
police to protect the interests of the community (Jackson et al. 2012). A benevolence-
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agencies are interested in the well-being of the community and that their resources are 
distributed fairly across society (Tyler and Fagan 2008). Low benevolence could result 
in the agency being deemed as acting opportunistically in the interests of a few 
privileged parties, rather than protecting the public as a whole. Furthermore, low 
benevolence could signal perceived relational failure, in that the institution has failed to 
anticipate how stakeholders would view their intentions (Frederickson and Hart 1985). 
One example of the importance of benevolence is demonstrated by the observation that 
when the ethnic makeup of police officers reflects the diversity of the communities 
served – a phenomenon dubbed “black in blue – law enforcement agencies tend to be 
perceived as having greater legitimacy than otherwise (Sounman 2017; Tyler, 
Schulhofer, and Huq 2010). The prevalence of group-based targeting in digital security 
surveillance potentially places benevolence at the core of citizens’ concerns about the 
use of DSTs – a phenomenon exemplified by the experience of “flying while Muslim” 
(Blackwood, Hopkins, and Reicher 2015). 
Competence. Citizens’ trustworthiness assessments of security agencies premised 
on competence rest on an instrumentally rational belief system, in which citizens seek 
maximum utility from the DST deployment (Meško and Tankebe 2014). Citizens thus 
prioritize competence out of self-interest. Instrumental rationality is also the belief 
system that underpins the security–privacy trade-off (Solove 2011). In the law 
enforcement context, citizens judge agencies as competent if they perceive that they 
control crime effectively. Research reports international variation in the importance of 
competence-based trustworthiness assessments of agencies such as the police. Eastern 
cultures consider competence more important in their assessments, as do postcolonial 
societies where institutions are emerging from authoritarianism and corruption 
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short term (Meško and Tankebe 2014), as trustworthiness has a basis beyond 
performance indicators. Longer-term trustworthiness rests on the normative dimensions 
of benevolence and integrity, which indicate principled authority. In practical terms, low 
competence indicates perceived operational failure, which may stem from political, 
social, legal, or economic changes to actions carried out by suppliers; poor strategic 
decision making; or low technical capability (Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer 2014).  
Integrity. Trustworthiness assessments based on integrity are premised on the 
public’s belief that the institution adheres to an acceptable set of moral values (Hough et 
al. 2010). Low integrity indicates that citizens perceive an institution as having failed to 
act according to an appropriate set of values. In integrity-based trustworthiness 
assessments, citizens are concerned with whether the security agencies shares their 
views about right and wrong, has the same moral compass (known as “value 
congruence”), and will not abuse its power. If citizens believe that law enforcement 
agencies are acting morally, the power bestowed on it is justified. These beliefs are 
influenced by the consistency of the institution’s past actions, credible communications, 
and whether the citizen and the institution share a strong sense of justice. Stance taking 
is therefore important: deploying a DST that provokes a human rights risk has a bearing 
on how the public assesses the security agency’s integrity. A particular DST can thus 
signal security agencies’ moral and other priorities, and the greater the risk, the greater 
is the requirement for moral action (Simpson, Harrell, and Willer 2013).  
These three belief systems clearly have contrasting foundations: a normative 
group orientation, instrumental rationality, and a normative moral orientation. Tyler 
(2005) argues that lasting satisfaction with law enforcement and crime control rests on 
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as indicated in the following proposition, these systems are assumed to exert a separate 
but correlated influence on citizens’ views of DSTs. 
Proposition 1: Perceived benevolence, competence, and integrity of the security 
agent will have a separate and distinct positive impact on the acceptability of each of the 
DST cases. 
 
DSTs and Data Vulnerabilities 
Returning to Akter, D’Ambra, and Ray’s (2011) definition and the second aspect of the 
research question, this section considers the risks involved in the relationship between 
the citizen and the security agency. Although trustworthiness and risk appear mutually 
interdependent, one way to separate them is to investigate the vulnerability, or felt risk, 
that citizens experience because of DST deployment. Vulnerability refers to citizens’ 
perception of their potential susceptibility to harm resulting from a particular risk 
(Martin, Borah, and Palmatier 2017).  
As security methods become more data intensive, data vulnerabilities – 
vulnerability to data collection risks, data misuse risks, and subsequent human rights 
violations – become part of the trustworthiness assessment. Data collection risks include 
personal exposure, the excessive collection of sensitive information, and malicious use 
of personal information (Smith, Milberg, and Burke 1996). Data misuse risks include 
control over data sharing and use by third parties, breaches of confidentiality, 
unauthorized disclosure, and the dissemination of false information (Solove 2008). 
Human rights violations involve reduced freedom of speech, association, or expression 
and self-determination (Sanquist, Mahy, and Morris 2008). Moreover, according to 
privacy scholars (Nissenbaum 2009), the contexts within which data processing occurs 
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is expected in trustworthiness assessments, as the risks associated with data collection 
and use vary by the DSTs used. Trustworthiness scholars also confirm the importance 
of context specificity. Meaningful trustworthiness assessments must be made with 
respect to specific episodes in particular locales, between closely defined sections of the 
population, and in relation to the actions of specific institutions (Cvetkovich and 
Nakayachi 2007).  
In addition to specifying context according to the DST risks as set out in the 
previous paragraph, this research also tests whether trustworthiness assessments vary 
depending on whether citizens support or oppose their use. As such, the propositions are 
explored in the context of three contrasting DSTs, each of which present differing data 
vulnerabilities to the public and may be either supported or opposed. The differences 
between the DST cases are now explored in terms of their data vulnerabilities to explore 
how their level of intrusiveness influences citizens’ assessments of security agency 
trustworthiness. One additional assumption is made within the context of the three 
DSTs studied, as follows:  
Proposition 2: The basis of trustworthiness assessments will vary between the 
DST cases because of the different data vulnerabilities associated with each. Perceived 
data vulnerabilities will negatively influence people’s views on the acceptability of each 
DST.  
Cases and Method 
DSTs and Data Vulnerabilities 
This article features three DSTs that security agencies use. Each forms an empirical 
case, for which a context-specific description is set out and used for testing. The DSTs 
are smart CCTV (sCCTV), smartphone location tracking (SLT), and deep packet 
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international security settings, and each is supplied and supported by a network of 
technology contractors from the private sector (for more details, see appendix).   
sCCTV is used by homeland security agencies such as the police and national 
border forces to identify suspicious behavior in specific public spaces, such as airports 
and roads. Applications of sCCTV range from automatic detection of criminal behavior, 
to identification of search-listed criminals or unwanted individuals, to the prosecution of 
traffic offenders (Möllers and Hälterlein 2013). Security agencies use SLT, which can 
be performed through carrier-assisted surveillance, among other things (Pell and 
Soghoian 2013), to locate, follow, monitor, and gather evidence on suspects. SLT is 
used by security services and law enforcement agencies to glean information about the 
location and movements of the phone user over time. This technology is applied in the 
investigation of many different types of security threat, from traffic offences to terror 
attacks. Finally, DPI is routinely used by security agencies internationally, such as the 
National Security Agency (NSA) and Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ), to examine the content of Internet communications to identify criminal 
activity such as the distribution of child pornography, hate speech, or terrorism 
(Porcedda 2013). In the UK, as well as in other countries, a warrant is required to 
examine the contents of online communications. 
Each of these DSTs provokes varying degrees of data vulnerability in the way 
they expose citizens to data collection risks, data misuse risks, and subsequent human 
rights violations (see table 1). First, the sensitivity of information collected by each DST 
is progressively more severe, with sCCTV being the least severe case because it 
operates in public spaces (Degli-Esposti and Santiago-Gómez 2015) and DPI being the 
most severe. sCCTV collects images of vehicles and people, comparing them with 
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security agencies or the police. SLT collects smartphone information about people’s 
movements and location, producing a plethora of metadata that reveal much about their 
and activities. DPI reveals the content of any communication sent through online means 
and also dissects network data to extract useful metadata. 
Second, the visibility of this data collection to citizens progressively decreases, 
with sCCTV being the most visible and DPI the most opaque. Citizens thus have 
progressively less control over their exposure to surveillance. Although the software 
algorithms running in sCCTV systems are operationally obscure (Introna and Wood 
2004), smartphones and sCCTV cameras are still publicly visible, and European data 
protection laws require citizens to be notified when sCCTV is in operation. In the case 
of SLT, and despite the various methods to locate these devices, many users know that 
they can disable geolocalization functions, switch off the phone, and remove the battery 
to avoid being tracked. By contrast, Internet users have no way of knowing if DPI is in 
operation, unless they have considerable technical knowledge and are aware of the 
location of the security agency facilities that use it (Clement 2013). 
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Data 
Citizen Summit Events. Data were gathered during 12 citizen summits held in nine 
European countries in the spring of 2014. In their original form, citizen summits are a 
forum for public engagement used to inform voters and poll opinions about matters of 
political and social importance (Migchelbrink and Van de Walle 2020; Moynihan 
2003). Citizens invited to participate in these summits tend to represent the composition 
of the city, region or national context, in which the summit is organized. In Europe, the 
method was originally applied as part of a global project about biodiversity (Bedsted et 
al. 2015) because it enabled participants to share and deliberate over different 
arguments (Burchardt 2014), before reaching a decision about the issue being debated. 
Deliberative processes have therefore been used to address democratic deficit problems 
(Nabatchi 2010) and increase public participation in policy decisions (Dean 2017; 
Roberts 2004).  
The type of citizen summit used here combines a participatory ethos with 
meticulously designed and tested data collection methods, to ensure that participants 
were familiar with the use, functions, benefits, and limits of each DST, before 
expressing their views. The individual data-gathering elements were framed to reflect 
the theoretical underpinning of the propositions (Tunarosa and Glynn 2017), and they 
confirm the utility of a multimethod approach to assessing public opinion on national 
security matters (Reddick, Chatfield, and Jaramillo 2015).  
The day-long summits were divided into segments in which participants viewed 
documentary films, discussed the content while seated in table groups, and then 
answered questions in plenary sessions about their views. Several distinctive features 
were included to engage the public in debate. First, information about the three DSTs 
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written especially for the empirical work by the authors in an accessible style. The 
magazine was based on the information collected from a gray literature review and the 
key informant interviews and set up the contrasting case contexts a priori (Kreissl et al. 
2013). The document progressed through four rounds of internal review before 
publication, to ensure that the information could be easily digested, the format was 
sufficiently engaging, and the arguments were well balanced. Four additional rounds of 
external review took place with the project’s advisory board and were piloted with 
citizens.  
Second, during the summit, participants viewed a short documentary film about 
each DST. The films featured extracts from the key informant interviews and 
information about data vulnerabilities, benefits, and discussion points about the DSTs 
gleaned from the literature review. Short films are an accepted method for relaying 
information in which questions with ethical or human rights implications are considered 
(Eifler 2007). Both the magazine and films, which are publicly available, were 
translated into 11 European languages.  
Third, participants were seated in table groups with a facilitator, to support rich 
debate that was recorded by a notetaker. Every summit had approximately 25 discussion 
groups, each with approximately eight participants, a notetaker, and a table facilitator. 
Participants were assigned to these groups to ensure maximum variation in socio-
demographics across tables. This approach is intended to ensure a range of different 
views feed into the discussion. Qualitative insights generated by the mixed-methods 
design are reported in Pavone et al. (2017) and in Degli-Esposti and Santiago-Gómez 
(2015).  
Fourth, opinions were gathered using an attitude survey and polling keypads, to 
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Significant effort was made to ensure that the questionnaire was appropriate for use in a 
plenary voting setting, with the instrument progressing through four rounds of piloting. 
Questions were short and simple, with clear wording that avoided double negatives. 
Multi-item measures for single subscales would have been too repetitive, so a careful 
choice was made of the measures recorded using a five-point Likert scale. Questions 
were presented in a logical order so that the head facilitator could share the range of 
responses in the room.  
DST Between-Case Design. The nine countries selected for the data collection 
cover North (Norway, Denmark, and UK), Central (Austria, Germany, and 
Switzerland), and Southern/Eastern (Italy, Hungary, and Spain) Europe. Countries were 
grouped into simple clusters to maximize contextual variability and to increase external 
validity. Because each citizen summit was time limited, two of the three DSTs were 
considered in each cluster, one in the morning session of the summit and one in the 
afternoon session. Two methods were used to assign cases to clusters and ensure 
maximum variability in the clusters. First, Hofstede’s (2003) criteria (power distance, 
individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and 
indulgence) were used, as national culture can affect the relationship among trust in 
government, its antecedents (Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2013), and internal dimensions 
(Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis 2007). Second, the findings of Eurostat survey (Eurostat 
2013) – the most recent at the time of the research – helped maximize contextual 
variability with respect to perceived institutional trust. The country clusters and DSTs 
captured the variability in the level of trust these countries’ citizens had in the police, 
the legal and political system, and other people (see appendix). Each cluster included a 
mix of high (e.g. Norway) and low (e.g. Spain) trust countries. Information on the 
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possible by the national sociodemographic mix in each participating country, citizens 
were recruited to ensure variability in sample composition with regard to gender, age, 
and educational level. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Measures. As in previous studies (Pavone and Degli-Esposti 2012), the dependent 
variable – public acceptance of DSTs – was measured on a five-point Likert scale to 
capture the extent to which participants agreed with the following statement: “Overall I 
support the adoption of [DPI/sCCTV/SLT] as a national security measure.” The 
independent variables were also measured on five-point Likert scales, using previously 
validated statements from other studies. Questionnaire items based on previous studies 
served to measure benevolence, competence, and integrity (McKnight, Choudhury, and 
Kacmar 2002), as well as the level of intrusiveness and effectiveness of the surveillance 
technologies. In line with previous studies, the control variables included participants’ 
age, gender, education level, understanding of DSTs’ functionality, information privacy 
concerns (Smith, Milberg, and Burke 1996), DSTs’ perceived security benefits 
(Sanquist, Mahy, and Morris 2008), and general perceived level of threat. Additional 
control variables measuring whether participants belonged to a minority ethnic group, 
had children living with them, and were familiar with sCCTV systems, smartphones, 
and the Internet were also introduced in the model. 
The dependent variables, independent variables, and covariates in the model 
reflect individual attitudes – that is, settled ways of thinking or feeling about the issues 
(Greenwald 2014). As the focus is on measuring the perceptions of participants who had 
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appropriate (MacKenzie and Podsakoff 2012). The public administration literature has 
criticized survey methods for exposure to common method bias, which can artificially 
inflate the results and produce false positives caused by correlated measurement errors. 
However, this problem arises when the independent variable is an individual attitude 
and the dependent variable is an organizational attribute (Jakobsen and Jensen 2015), so 
this study is not affected.  
Quantile Regression. Quantile regression was used to identify the factors 
influencing the perceptions of citizens who support the adoption of DSTs versus those 
who oppose it. Quantile regression is a nonparametric extension of linear regression that 
models selected conditional quantiles as a function of predictors (Koenker 2005). While 
conventional regression focuses on the mean, quantile regression can describe the entire 
conditional distribution of the dependent variable (Hao and Naiman 2007). It has been 
used in economics to investigate the effect of years of schooling on observed wages, 
wage structure, and wage premiums for union members (Koenker 2005); in 
management and in other areas to test, for instance, the effect of various tourist 
spending factors on low, medium, and high spender behavior (Lew and Ng 2012). 
In this study, quantile regression enables a comparison of the views of those who 
disagree or strongly disagree with the use of each DST, represented in the 25th quantile 
of the dependent variable distribution, with the views of those who agree or strongly 
agree, represented in the 75th quantile. By comparing the findings for the 25th and 75th 
quantiles, the effect of each trustworthiness dimension on the opinions of both 
opponents and supporters of each DST can be identified. Although a discrete scale 
measures the dependent variable, continuity is assumed in the dependent variable, based 
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Findings 
The results are presented in two parts. In the first, the escalating degrees of data 
vulnerability associated with each DST are revealed, through the levels of reported 
participant agreement with alternative statements about the degree of intrusiveness and 
unease associated with each DST. In the second, the results of the quantile regression 
are presented. 
 
Perceived Data Vulnerabilities and the Between-Case Design 
Each DST presented citizens with escalating degrees of data vulnerability, expressed in 
terms of exposure of sensitive information, loss of control over that exposure, and 
perceived vulnerability to human rights violations. Figure 1 displays the level of 
agreement with the three statements used to measure data vulnerabilities and with 
statements about the degree of intrusiveness associated with each DST. The average 
values show an escalation in participants’ concerns when discussing sCCTV, SLT, and 
DPI, respectively, confirming the basis of the between-case design. Citizens were 
concerned about the individual or collective human rights violations linked to the 
implementation of the DSTs, with DPI being especially of concern. They also worried 
about the unintended disclosure of sensitive, personal information and their lack of 
control over this risk. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Quantile Regression Results 
Quantile regression explored the propositions in each of the three DST cases. Table 3 
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critical of each DST. Table 4 shows the quantile regression for the 75th quantile, which 
includes the group that is more favorable about using each DST. Coefficients 
significantly different from zero appear in bold in the tables. The exact p-value and 
significance level appear in the column labeled P>t.  
The findings confirm between-case differences in trustworthiness assessments 
along its subscales, with benevolence being important for all DSTs. Proposition 1, 
which suggests a positive relationship between security agencies’ benevolence and DST 
acceptance, is confirmed across all DSTs and for all study participants. The positive 
effect of security agencies’ perceived competence on citizens’ willingness to accept 
each DST is confirmed in all cases but, in the case of sCCTV, only for the group of 
participants more favorable about this DST. Security agencies’ integrity positively 
influences the views only of citizens more critical about the use of SLT and DPI. These 
results confirm citizens’ need to be reassured about security agencies’ competence and 
integrity when confronted with riskier DSTs. 
Proposition 2, which establishes a negative effect of DST data vulnerabilities on 
their perceived acceptability, is also confirmed. However, the effect is significant only 
for the risk of revealing sensitive data and violating human rights for sCCTV and DPI. 
SLT seems more innocuous to citizens, perhaps because of their greater personal 
familiarity with this technology. Nonetheless, more critical citizens are also less willing 
to accept SLT because of the perceived lack of control over geolocation functionalities.  
In line with those who criticize the privacy–security trade-off (Solove 2011), 
participants acknowledge the effectiveness of using DSTs for security purposes, while 
also being concerned about the amount of data collected. Confirming previous studies 
(Sanquist, Mahy, and Morris 2008), Kendall rank correlation coefficients show that 
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trustworthiness correlate positively with measures of security benefits and negatively 
with risk measures. However, correlation values were not sufficiently high to create 
multicollinearity in the regression model. The model shows good explanatory power 
with regard to the views of citizens who are more critical about each DST (pseudo-R
2 
goodness-of-fit measure for the 25th quantile regression: sCCTV: 0.49; SLT: 0.44; DPI: 
0.38) and good explanatory power in accounting for the opinions of those who are 
neither negative nor supportive (pseudo-R
2 
for the median regression: sCCTV: 0.35; 
SLT: 0.32; DPI: 0.35).  
 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 




This article examines the basis on which EU citizens support and oppose the use of 
digital surveillance to protect national security through an institutional trustworthiness 
lens across three DST cases, which present escalating degrees of privacy risk to citizens. 
The concept of data vulnerability was used to assess the degree of privacy risk felt by 
citizens in respect of each DST.  
The paper’s most important finding is that benevolence is central to the 
acceptance of DSTs regardless of data vulnerability levels. The findings highlight that 
for all DSTs to be accepted, security agencies need to act explicitly in the interests of 
the collectivity, the community and the group, rather than opportunistically and in a self 
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using DSTs (Jackson et al. 2012). This finding underpinned the views of both those who 
supported and those who opposed the use of DSTs. It confirms that citizens’ first 
question when any DST is used is likely to be “what’s in it for us?”  
The article also found that as data vulnerabilities increased, so did the range of 
institutional trustworthiness concerns, measured using the subscales. For DSTs 
considered more intrusive and risky, citizens also demand reassurance about security 
agencies’ competence and integrity. Competence was important for those who 
supported and those who opposed the adoption of the two more intrusive DSTs: SLT 
and DPI. This finding confirms that citizens are likely to ask utilitarian, instrumentally 
rational questions about security agencies’ ability to operate these DSTs efficiently and 
the extent to which tangible improvements in security will occur as data vulnerability 
increases (Meško and Tankebe 2014). If citizens believe that the security agency 
operates the DST competently, they are more likely to accept its adoption.   
Integrity was also a basis of opposition to the same two DSTs, suggesting that 
opposition rests on questions about the responsible use of power that reflects shared 
moral norms and values (Hough et al. 2010). The breadth of the human rights’ 
consequences discussed in the summit support materials indicates that these moral 
concerns may go beyond the issue of privacy to other areas, such as freedom of speech 
and autonomy. The findings indicate that assurances about the moral stance of a security 
agency are more likely to convince citizens who oppose the technology that it should be 
adopted.  
The findings demonstrate that there are institutional dimensions to citizens’ views 
on DSTs that extend beyond the security–privacy trade-off and challenge two common 
governmental tropes about the general public’s opinions about national security 
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an individualized, instrumentally rational security–privacy trade-off. Each 
trustworthiness subscale – benevolence, competence, and integrity – was interpreted as 
a belief system based on contrasting foundations. The competence subscale is 
acknowledged to rest on instrumentally rational assessments and thus represents part of 
the security–privacy trade-off. The trade off would suggest that the debate about DSTs 
begins and ends with competency. Yet concerns reflecting normative beliefs arise in 
parallel, with the normative concern of benevolence central for all assessments. The 
popular saying “nothing to hide, nothing to fear” is also challenged. Rather than 
showing that all those who oppose surveillance have “something to hide,” these findings 
suggest that opposition may also stem from parallel concerns. These include whether 
security agencies are acting in the interests of the communities they serve and, where 
more privacy intrusive DSTs are used, whether these agencies have the relevant 
capabilities and moral values. As Yamagishi, Kikuchi, and Kosugi (1999) argue, trustful 
people are not cultural dopes; they are vigilant and prudent as they process information 
about an actor’s trustworthiness and nurture their “social intelligence” to detect signals 
of untrustworthiness.  
Previous observations about the relative influence of benevolence, competence, 
and integrity in other settings are confirmed. The results uphold the importance of 
community interests with regard to benevolence (Sounman 2017). They also confirm 
the previous observation that when competence emerges as significant, it tends to be 
accompanied by one or more of the normative dimensions, rather than emerging on its 
own (Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer 2014; Meško and Tankebe 2014). The emergence of 
integrity as the basis for opposition to SLT and DPI supports the views of Simpson, 
Harrell, and Willer (2013) and Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer (2014), who note that as 
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reflects the importance of morality identified in studies of other surveillance 
technologies currently in use (Bromberg, Charbonneau, and Smith 2018; West and 
Bowman 2016). 
The diverse ways the public engages with DSTs highlight several practical and 
policy questions. Increasing law enforcement agencies trustworthiness may initially be 
thought to lie in the increased reporting of performance, reflecting the competence 
subscale. The findings show that policy implications can be generated using all three 
trustworthiness dimensions. Reflecting benevolence, promoting citizen participation in 
security agendas can promote congruence around community interests. A more nuanced 
picture of the outcomes of digital security surveillance for different groups may emerge, 
perhaps generating more inclusive, equitable, and sensitive applications. Efforts to 
improve transparency and to protect democratic rights in security settings will influence 
perceptions of integrity: whether the agency will “do the right thing” and not abuse its 
power. The democratic process can act to embrace feelings of opposition, avoidance, 
and resistance to privacy violations rather than outflank them, as the rhetoric of the 
trade-off and the “nothing to hide, nothing to fear” stance suggest. 
The article also makes two methodological contributions. The between-case 
design exposes the influence of the trustworthiness assessment on DST acceptance in 
three cases, which show higher degrees of perceived data vulnerability. The design 
guarantees the robustness of results and foregrounds the consistent effect of 
benevolence across the three DST cases and for all groups of respondents. The second 
contribution is the use of quantile regression to attain further nuance, by highlighting 
similarities and differences in perceptions, between those who support and those who 
oppose digital surveillance. A great deal of policy making relies on finding solutions for 
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irrelevant for which parts of the population. The quantile regression approach provides 
additional insights by focusing on polarized rather than average views. 
Finally, this article has several limitations, which provide avenues for future 
research. First, while the results present an international picture, further research could 
consider how different DSTs within different states affect different communities. 
Second, the European Union is, as a research site, a relatively homogeneous social 
democratic political system. Replications of the research in authoritarian or recently 
postauthoritarian countries in transition arrangements may yield different findings. 
Third, as this research is quantitative in nature, more fine-grained research would reveal 
exactly how each individual belief system functions in its formation of public attitudes. 
Finally, as this was a cross-sectional rather than longitudinal study, the temporal 
dimension of the relationships should be explored in future.  
 
Conclusion 
This article establishes that institutional trustworthiness dimensions – especially 
benevolence, but also competence and integrity – shape citizens’ views on digital 
surveillance used in security operations. Digital surveillance is now a routine feature of 
national security measures. It offers security benefits but also provokes privacy risks 
because of the volume of captured and processed citizen data. Citizens experience these 
risks as data vulnerabilities linked to concerns about the exposure and sharing of their 
information and the associated human rights’ implications. As long as digital 
surveillance remains a dominant feature of national security policy, national security 
agencies will need to reconcile its transformatory impact with public expectations of 
how they protect privacy and human rights and act with benevolence, competence, and 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
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Table 1 Summary Characteristics of Each DST 





























Most common use is 
Automatic Number 
Plate Recognition 
(ANPR) to identify 
vehicles that have been 
stolen, driven without 
tax or insurance, or 
committed a traffic 
offence. 
Can be used to obtain 
evidence against 
suspected criminals, 
locate missing persons, 
and place people at the 
scene of a crime. 
Originally developed to 
detect viruses and 
malware, but now also 
used to manage digital 
rights, target 
advertising, and identify 
dangerous or criminal 
activity online, such as 
the distribution of child 
pornography, hate 

































A person’s travel 
movements on roads, in 
airports, and in other 
public places available 
to unknown third 
parties. 
All personal movements 
of someone carrying a 
smartphone potentially 
visible to unknown third 
parties. 
All communications 
content of someone 
surfing the Internet 
potentially visible to 




















In the EU, the presence 
of CCTV cameras in 
public space must be 
declared. Citizens can 
avoid areas with 
sCCTV. 
It is possible to disable 
some location-based 
services and GPS 
capability on a 
smartphone, though 
alternative means exist 
to geolocate the phone. 
Impossible to know 
when and where DPI is 
in operation; any 
communication is 

















? Discrimination against 
minority groups (e.g., 
Project Champion). 
Violation of freedom of 
speech and right to 
protest (e.g., use of 
Twitter location data to 
track Occupy 
protestors). 
Violation of freedom of 
speech, freedom of 
association, and right to 
protest (e.g., quashing 
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Table 2 DSTs Discussed in Each Country and Demographic Composition of Samples 
    sCCTV SLT DPI 
1. Denmark   
 
2. Germany   
 
3. Hungary   
 
4. Austria  
 
 
5. UK  
 
 








   
9. Italy     
    Women 48% 45% 48% 
Age: 18–49 years 57% 50% 52% 
Education before university 61% 48% 55% 
Ethnic minority 17% 21% 24% 
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Table 3 Results of the 25th Quantile Regression for the Three DSTs 
25th quantile (people opposing the adoption of 






 Coef. Std. Err. P>t Coef. Std. Err. P>t Coef. Std. Err. P>t 
Age .13 .03 .000 .08 .04 .026 .02 .04 .588 
Gender .20 .11 .062 .05 .10 .633 .22 .11 .038 
Minority ethnic group .16 .14 .263 .09 .13 .488 .05 .13 .715 
Children at home .06 .12 .635 .04 .11 .736 .24 .12 .040 
Education .04 .04 .340 -.05 .03 .167 -.08 .04 .027 
Familiarity with [CCTV/smartphone/internet] .06 .04 .163 .16 .05 .003 -.02 .07 .727 
Understanding of [sCCTV/SLT/DPI] -.03 .05 .491 -.17 .06 .006 -.01 .04 .742 
Feeling safe in daily life -.10 .06 .103 -.03 .06 .656 -.04 .06 .528 
Worries about online security .12 .05 .013 .07 .04 .133 .03 .05 .581 
[sCCTV/SLT/DPI] improves national security 1.07 .12 .000 1.01 .11 .000 .81 .12 .000 
Concerns about excessive data collection -.15 .06 .012 -.20 .06 .001 -.13 .07 .041 
Concerns about unauthorized data sharing .04 .07 .581 .04 .07 .561 .05 .10 .619 
P1.a Benevolence .12 .06 .030 .18 .06 .004 .14 .06 .021 
P1.b Competence .18 .06 .005 .12 .06 .037 .15 .06 .018 
P1.c Integrity .08 .06 .191 .13 .06 .030 .17 .06 .006 
P2.a [sCCTV/SLT/DPI] revealing sensitive 
information 
-.21 .05 .000 -.15 .06 .009 -.17 .06 .006 
P2.b [sCCTV/SLT/DPI] is forced upon me -.04 .05 .435 -.10 .05 .038 -.11 .07 .108 
P2.c [sCCTV/SLT/DPI] could violate everyone’s 
human rights 
-.23 .05 .000 -.05 .06 .329 -.18 .06 .002 
Constant term 2.37 .59 .000 2.37 .58 .000 3.11 .72 .000 
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Table 4 Results of the 75th Quantile Regression for the Three DSTs 
75th quantile (people supporting the adoption of 








Coef. Std. Err. P>t Coef. Std. Err. P>t Coef. Std. Err. P>t 
Age .07 .04 .046 .07 .04 .111 .04 .04 .387 
Gender .00 .11 .992 .06 .12 .643 .12 .12 .308 
Minority ethnic group -.07 .15 .651 .16 .15 .295 -.02 .15 .885 
Children at home -.04 .13 .732 .08 .14 .574 .19 .14 .169 
Education -.01 .04 .900 -.11 .04 .010 -.11 .04 .009 
Familiarity with [CCTV/smartphone/internet] .00 .04 .974 .14 .07 .033 -.08 .08 .299 
Understanding of [sCCTV/SLT/DPI] -.06 .05 .238 .08 .08 .276 .03 .05 .576 
Feeling safe in daily life -.18 .06 .005 .00 .07 .992 -.01 .07 .906 
Worries about online security .11 .05 .034 .08 .05 .117 .08 .06 .177 
[sCCTV/SLT/DPI] improves national security .60 .13 .000 .51 .13 .000 .67 .13 .000 
Concerns about excessive data collection -.16 .06 .015 -.19 .07 .009 -.13 .08 .097 
Concerns about unauthorized data sharing .07 .08 .365 .04 .09 .648 .10 .11 .381 
P1.a Benevolence .18 .06 .003 .19 .08 .013 .22 .07 .001 
P1.b Competence .09 .07 .190 .19 .07 .009 .15 .07 .038 
P1.c Integrity .01 .06 .915 .12 .08 .102 -.01 .07 .841 
P2.a [sCCTV/SLT/DPI] revealing sensitive 
information 
-.13 .06 .018 -.11 .07 .123 -.21 .07 .003 
P2.b [sCCTV/SLT/DPI] is forced upon me -.02 .05 .652 -.03 .06 .611 -.10 .08 .172 
P2.c [sCCTV/SLT/DPI] could violate everyone’s 
human rights 
-.13 .05 .019 -.07 .07 .328 -.14 .07 .036 
Constant term 4.65 .62 .000 2.28 .71 .002 4.41 .83 .000 
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Notes 
1. By ‘security agencies’ we mean the different government bodies which are 
responsible for maintaining security, law and order. This includes a nation’s territorial 
police forces, special police forces and border agencies. Although this research uses 
the term “security agencies,” it is also acknowledged that a wide range of state and 
nonstate actors collaborate in the provision of national security, with security agencies 
at the center (see White, 2012). In the citizen summits, participants explicitly 
identified the relevant security agencies in their national contexts when making their 
assessments. 
2. Edward Snowden’s revelations were especially noteworthy regarding the way in 
which security agencies collect and use people’s data, with suspicions intensifying as 
new incidents have occurred. Recent examples include the alleged racist violence 
expressed by U.S. border patrol agents in a secret Facebook group (Thompson 2019) 
and the diffusion of security technologies into civilian domains, such as democratic 
elections (DCMS 2018). 
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Table A.1 DSTs Discussed in Each Country and Level of Institutional Trust 
     Trust in …* 






1. Denmark   
 
7.9 7.5 5.9 8.3 
2. Germany   
 
6.4 5.3 4.9 5.5 
3. Hungary   
 
5.7 5.1 4.5 5.3 
4. Austria  
 
 7.2 6.0 4.4 5.9 
5. UK  
 
 6.4 5.5 3.8 6.1 
6. Spain  
 
 5.4 3.1 1.9 6.3 
7. Norway 
 
  7.5 7.2 5.9 7.3 
8. Switzerland 
 
   7.4 7.0 6.6 6.4 
9. Italy     5.8 3.6 2.1 5.7 
* Values indicate a weighted mean on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 = “no trust at all” to 
10 = “complete trust”. Source: Eurostat (2013) 
 
 
Table A.2 Detailed Descriptions of DST Cases 
The descriptions were devised following a systematic review of the security and data 
protection gray literature, in conjunction with key informant interviews with 12 security 
industry experts, consultants, scholars, and regulators (Schlehahn et al. 2013).  
 Smart CCTV (sCCTV) is used by homeland security agencies such as the police and 
national border forces to identify suspicious behavior in specific public spaces, such 
as airports and roads. Applications range from automatic detection of criminal 
behavior, to identification of search-listed criminal or unwanted individuals, to the 
prosecution of traffic offenders (Möllers and Hälterlein 2013). The most common use 
is Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) to identify vehicles that have been 
stolen, driven without tax or insurance, or committed traffic offences. Vehicle license 
plate details or image are captured when they pass sCCTV. Citizens may not be aware 
at the time that this information has been captured, and there is a risk of images being 
misinterpreted and false positive identification occurring, should an individual’s 
information be implicated in an investigation. Human rights vulnerabilities were 
manifested in a controversial UK case in which sCCTV cameras were installed in 
predominantly Muslim areas of Birmingham in 2010 under an antiterrorism program 
called “Project Champion” (Thornton 2010). In 2011, the British police in 
Birmingham, UK, had to remove ANPR cameras from three areas of the city that had 
a high Muslim population. The cameras were funded under Project Champion, but the 
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members of parliament strongly objected to the cameras, and community relations 
were damaged. Two hundred cameras were installed but were never switched on. The 
project’s failure and the loss of the cameras cost the police £300,000 (€351,414) 
(Lewis 2010). 
 Smartphone location tracking (SLT), which can be performed through carrier-assisted 
surveillance, among other things (Pell and Soghoian 2013), is used to locate, follow, 
monitor, and gather evidence of suspects. SLT is used by security services and law 
enforcement agencies to glean information about the location and movements of the 
phone user over time. It is used in investigations locally, nationally, and 
internationally for many different types of security threat, from traffic offences to 
terror attacks. SLT can reveal citizens’ movements and specific locations to a third 
party, should that information be shared. Anyone carrying a smartphone that is turned 
on and registering its location on cell towers, via apps and location-based services, 
can easily be tracked. Human rights vulnerabilities manifested by the policing of the 
Occupy movement in Germany and the United States, where location data were used 
to track protestors (Ungerleider 2012). The Occupy movement is an international 
social-political movement protesting against economic inequality and promoting 
participatory democracy. It began with a group of veterans setting up camp in New 
York in September 2011, but through coordination on social media and other methods 
has spread to cities around the world. 
 Deep packet inspection (DPI) is routinely used by security agencies internationally to 
examine the content of Internet communications to identify criminal activity. 
Agencies, such as the NSA and GCHQ, use DPI to identify malicious activity online, 
such as the distribution of child pornography, hate speech, or terrorism (Porcedda 
2013). All electronic communications can be subject to DPI, raising immediate 
information privacy concerns with every electronic communication. This technology 
is opaque, making it impossible for citizens to know when and where their 
communication data are monitored. DPI is banned in Europe, but all messages that 
travel through servers based in the United States, where it is unregulated, are subject 
to it. DPI raises privacy concerns as it renders all unencrypted online communication 
visible to unknown third parties, should those communications travel across their 
networks. Human rights vulnerabilities have manifested from DPI, which has been 
linked to online censorship around the world and to several politically repressive 
regimes. Documentary evidence suggests that DPI was used to monitor political 
opponents of the Syrian government (Fuchs 2013), and it was allegedly used by the 
Libyan and Egyptian governments to crush dissent in the Arab Spring (Brandom 
2014). The Arab Spring was a series of prodemocracy protests and uprisings that 
took place in several largely Muslim countries, including Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, 
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The head facilitator will inform citizen summit participants that all responses gathered using the 
clickers are completely and irreversibly anonymous, and that data collected as part of the event will 
be used for scientific purposes and only showed in aggregate. 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 
I. First, we’d just like to ask a few questions about you so we can get used to using the clickers. 
1. How old are you? 
 Click 1 for ‘18-29’ 
 Click 2 for ‘30-39’ 
 Click 3 for ‘40-49’ 
 Click 4 for ‘50-59’ 
 Click 5 for ‘60-69’ 
 Click 6 for ‘Over 70’ 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
2. What is your gender?  
 Click 1 for ‘female’ 
 Click 2 for ‘male’ 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
GENERAL ATTITUDES OF THE PARTICIPANTS 
(BEFORE SOST SPECIFIC SESSIONS) 
II. Now we are going to ask you about how safe you feel in your daily life. The question appears 
in the form of a statement. You can choose between 5 different responses: 
 If you strongly agree with the statement, click 1 
 If you agree with the statement, click 2 
 If you neither agree nor disagree with the statement, click 3 
 If you disagree with the statement, click 4 
 If you strongly disagree with the statement, click 5 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
3. I generally feel safe in my daily life. 
4. I worry about security when I am online. 
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III. Now we’d like to ask you about your knowledge of these issues before you came along to this 
event, and before you read our magazine. There are four possible responses. 
6. Before reading the SurPRISE information booklet how would you rate your knowledge 
of surveillance-oriented security technologies? 
 Click 1 for ‘I am very knowledgeable’ 
 Click 2 for ‘I know a good amount but it would be useful to learn more’ 
 Click 3 for ‘I have some knowledge of surveillance-oriented security 
technologies ’ 
 Click 4 for ‘I know little to nothing about surveillance-oriented security 
technologies’ 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
IV. This question is about your views on surveillance-oriented security technologies and privacy.  
V. A surveillance-oriented security technology is a technology which collects information 
about the general population and their activities in order to tackle a security problem. 
VI. Privacy refers to the ability of an individual to be left alone, out of public view, and in 
control of information about oneself. 
VII. We define security as the condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; a 
feeling of safety or freedom from or absence of danger. 
Again there are 5 possible responses and you need to choose one.  
 If you strongly agree with the statement, click 1 
 If you agree with the statement, click 2 
 If you neither agree nor disagree with the statement, click 3 
 If you disagree with the statement, click 4 
 If you strongly disagree with the statement, click 5 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
7. Overall I believe surveillance-oriented security technologies should be routinely 
implemented to improve national security. 
8. I am concerned that the use of surveillance-oriented security technologies is eroding my 
privacy. 
9. I am concerned that the use of surveillance-oriented security technologies is eroding 
privacy in general. 
VIII. In the information magazine we talked about alternative approaches to security which did 
not involve using security technologies. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with 
the following statement. Again there are 5 possible responses and you need to choose one.  
 If you strongly agree with the statement, click 1 
 If you agree with the statement, click 2 
 If you neither agree nor disagree with the statement, click 3 
 If you disagree with the statement, click 4 
 If you strongly disagree with the statement, click 5 
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10. Alternative approaches to security which do not involve surveillance oriented security 
technologies should be given higher priority. 
SOST SPECIFIC SESSIONS 
[CCTV = Smart CCTV] [DPI = Deep Packet Inspection] [SLT = Smartphone Location Tracking] 
IX. Now we are going to use the clickers again to answer a question about [the corresponding 
SOST]. You can choose between 5 different responses: 
 Click 1 for ‘Never’ 
 Click 2 for ‘Rarely’ 
 Click 3 for ‘Sometimes’ 
 Click 4 for ‘Often’ 
 Click 5 for ‘All of the time’ 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
11. [CCTV] In the area where you live, how often do you see CCTV cameras? 
12. [DPI] How often do you use the internet? 
[SLT] How often do you use mobile devices, such as mobile phones or smartphones? 
X. Before showing the first film, we are going to ask you about how familiar you are with [the 
corresponding SOST]. The question appears in the form of a statement. You can choose 
between 5 different responses: 
 If you strongly agree with the statement, click 1 
 If you agree with the statement, click 2 
 If you neither agree nor disagree with the statement, click 3 
 If you disagree with the statement, click 4 
 If you strongly disagree with the statement, click 5 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
13. [CCTV] I understand what smart CCTV is. 
14. [DPI] I understand what DPI is. 
[SLT] I understand what Smartphone Location Tracking is. 
SMART CCTV FILM 
CYBER SURVEILLANCE by DEEP PACKET INSPECTION FILM 
SMARTPHONE LOCATION TRACKING FILM 
XI. Now we are going to show you five statements about [the corresponding SOST]. There are 5 
choices of answer.  
 If you strongly agree with the statement, click 1 
 If you agree with the statement, click 2 
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 If you disagree with the statement, click 4 
 If you strongly disagree with the statement, click 5 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
15. In my opinion, Smart CCTV is an effective national security tool. 
16. The idea of smart CCTV makes me feel uncomfortable. 
17. I feel more secure when smart CCTV is in operation. 
18. I feel that smart CCTV is forced upon me without my permission. 
19. Smart CCTV is an appropriate way to address national security threats. 
20. In my opinion, DPI is an effective national security tool. 
21. The idea of DPI makes me feel uncomfortable. 
22. When I am online, I feel more secure because DPI is used. 
23. I feel DPI is forced upon me without my permission. 
24. DPI is an appropriate way to address national security threats. 
In my opinion, smartphone location tracking is an effective national security tool. 
The idea of smartphone location tracking makes me feel uncomfortable. 
I feel more secure thanks to smartphone location tracking. 
I feel smartphone location tracking is forced upon me without my permission. 
Smartphone location tracking is an appropriate way to address national security threats. 
XII. And here are three more statements about [the corresponding SOST]. Once again there are 5 
choices of answer.  
 If you strongly agree with the statement, click 1 
 If you agree with the statement, click 2 
 If you neither agree nor disagree with the statement, click 3 
 If you disagree with the statement, click 4 
 If you strongly disagree with the statement, click 5 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
25. Smart CCTV does not bother me as long as it only targets criminals. 
26. I worry about how the use of smart CCTV could develop in the future.  
27. Smart CCTV bothers me because it is used where I live. 
28. DPI does not bother me as long as it only targets criminals. 
29. I worry about how the use of DPI could develop in the future.  
30. DPI bothers me because it is used to track my online activities. 
Smartphone location tracking does not bother me as long as it only targets criminals. 
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Smartphone location tracking bothers me because it is used to track my smartphone. 
Discussions at the tables (45 minutes) 
XIII. Now we are going to look at privacy and [the corresponding SOST]. Once again we are 
going to show you three statements and there are five choices of answer. 
 If you strongly agree with the statement, click 1 
 If you agree with the statement, click 2 
 If you neither agree nor disagree with the statement, click 3 
 If you disagree with the statement, click 4 
 If you strongly disagree with the statement, click 5 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
Smart CCTV worries me because... 
31. ... it could reveal sensitive information about me. 
32. ... it could let strangers know where I am. 
33. ... it could result in my behaviour being misinterpreted. 
34. ... it could violate my fundamental human rights. 
DPI worries me because... 
35. ... it could reveal sensitive information about me. 
36. ... it could let strangers know where I am. 
37. ... it could result in my behaviour being misinterpreted. 
38. ... it could reveal the content of my communications. 
39. ... it could violate my fundamental human rights. 
Smartphone location tracking worries me because... 
... it could reveal sensitive information about me. 
... it could let strangers know where I am. 
... it could result in my behaviour being misinterpreted. 
... it could violate my fundamental human rights. 
XIV. These questions concern whether you would actively challenge the use of [the corresponding 
SOST] for security purposes.  
40. Choose the option which best reflects your opinion.  
 Click 1 for ‘I am prepared to use any means I can to prevent the use of smart 
CCTV for security purposes’ 
 Click 2 for ‘I am prepared to campaign actively against the use of smart CCTV 
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 Click 3 for ‘I would support others who were protesting against the use of smart 
CCTV for security purposes’ 
 Click 4 for ‘I would like to find out more about how to protect my privacy when 
I am in an area covered by smart CCTV’ 
 Click 5 for ‘I do not oppose it at all’ 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
41. Choose the option which best reflects your opinion.  
 Click 1 for ‘I am prepared to use any means I can to prevent the use of Deep 
Packet Inspection for security purposes’ 
 Click 2 for ‘I am prepared to campaign actively against the use of Deep Packet 
Inspection for security purposes’ 
 Click 3 for ‘I would support others who were protesting against the use of Deep 
Packet Inspection for security purposes’ 
 Click 4 for ‘I would like to find out more about how to protect my privacy when 
using the internet’ 
 Click 5 for ‘I do not oppose it at all’ 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
Choose the option which best reflects your opinion.  
 Click 1 for ‘I am prepared to use any means I can to prevent the use of 
smartphone location tracking for security purposes’ 
 Click 2 for ‘I am prepared to campaign actively against the use of smartphone 
location tracking for security purposes’ 
 Click 3 for ‘I would support others who were protesting against the use of 
smartphone location tracking for security purposes’ 
 Click 4 for ‘I would like to find out more about how to protect my privacy when 
using a smartphone’ 
 Click 5 for ‘I do not oppose it at all’ 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
XV. These questions concern whether you would actively avoid [the corresponding SOST]. 
42. Choose the option which better reflects your opinions.  
 Click 1 for ‘I would never go into areas where Smart CCTV is being used’ 
 Click 2 for ‘I would avoid going into areas where smart CCTV is being used’ 
 Click 3 for ‘I would change how I behave in areas where smart CCTV is used’ 
 Click 4 for ‘I do not think I would change my behaviour because of smart 
CCTV’ 
 Click 5 for ‘I would definitely not change my behaviour because of smart 
CCTV’ 
 Click 0 for ‘I do not know or I do not want to answer’ 
43. Choose the option which better reflects your opinions.  
 Click 1 for ‘I would not go online because of DPI’ 
 Click 2 for ‘I would avoid going online because of DPI’ 
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 Click 4 for ‘I do not think I would change my behaviour online because of DPI’ 
 Click 5 for ‘I would definitely not change my behaviour online because of DPI’ 
 Click 0 for ‘I do not know or I do not want to answer’ 
Choose the option which better reflects your opinions.  
 Click 1 for ‘I would not use a smartphone because of smartphone location 
tracking’ 
 Click 2 for ‘I would avoid using a smartphone because of smartphone location 
tracking’ 
 Click 2 for ‘I would change how I behave because of smartphone location 
tracking’ 
 Click 4 for ‘I do not think I would change my behaviour because of smartphone 
location tracking’ 
 Click 5 for ‘I would definitely not change my behaviour because of smartphone 
location tracking’ 
 Click 0 for ‘I do not know or I do not want to answer’ 
XVI. Here are four statements about the security agencies which use [the corresponding SOST] 
and how trustworthy you find them.  
XVII. By ‘security agencies’ we mean the different government bodies which are responsible for 
maintaining security, law and order. This includes a nation’s territorial police forces (give 
national example), special police forces (give national example) and border agencies (give 
national example). 
There are five choices of answer.  
 If you strongly agree with the statement, click 1 
 If you agree with the statement, click 2 
 If you neither agree nor disagree with the statement, click 3 
 If you disagree with the statement, click 4 
 If you strongly disagree with the statement, click 5 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
Security agencies which use Smart CCTV…  
44. …are trustworthy 
45. …are competent at what they do 
46. ...are concerned about the welfare of citizens as well as national security 
47. …do not abuse their power 
Security agencies which use DPI…  
48. …are trustworthy 
49. …are competent at what they do 
50. …are concerned about the welfare of citizens as well as national security 
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Security agencies which use smartphone location tracking…  
…are trustworthy 
…are competent at what they do 
...are concerned about the welfare of citizens as well as national security 
…do not abuse their power 
XVIII. Now we are going to show you four statements. Please click the number of the statement or 
statements you agree with, separated by * and complete by clicking send. If you for example 
agree with statement 1 and 3, you click 1*3 and send, if you agree with statements 1, 3 and 4 
you click 1*3*4 and send. 
52. Choose the options which better reflects your opinions.  
 Statement 1 is ‘Laws and regulations ensure that smart CCTV is not misused’ 
 Statement 2 is ‘I believe that Smart CCTV improves national security’ 
 Statement 3 is ‘I believe that Smart CCTV is intrusive’ 
 Statement 4 is ‘I think that the level of intrusivess is acceptable given the 
benefits it offers’ 
 Statement 5 is ‘None of the above’ 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
53. Choose the options which better reflects your opinions.  
 Statement 1 is ‘Laws and regulations ensure that DPI is not misused’ 
 Statement 2 is ‘I believe DPI improves national security’ 
 Statement 3 is ‘I believe DPI is intrusive’ 
 Statement 4 is ‘I think the level of intrusiveness is acceptable given the national 
security benefits it offers’ 
 Statement 5 is ‘None of the above’ 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
Choose the options which better reflects your opinions.  
 Statement 1 is ‘Laws and regulations ensure that smartphone location tracking is 
not misused’ 
 Statement 2 is ‘I believe smartphone location tracking improves national 
security’ 
 Statement 3 is ‘I believe smartphone location tracking is intrusive’ 
 Statement 4 is ‘I think the level of intrusiveness is acceptable given the national 
security benefits it offers’ 
 Statement 5 is ‘None of the above’ 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
XIX. This time we are going to ask you to choose which of the following four statements you 
mostly agree with. 
54. Choose the options which better reflects your opinions.  
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 Click 2 if you think that smart CCTV is useful but highly intrusive 
 Click 3 if you think that smart CCTV is useless and highly intrusive 
 Click 4 if you think that smart CCTV neither useful nor intrusive 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
55. Choose the options which better reflects your opinions.  
 Click 1 if you think that DPI is useful and not very intrusive 
 Click 2 if you think that DPI is useful but highly intrusive 
 Click 3 if you think that DPI is useless and highly intrusive 
 Click 4 if you think that DPI is neither useful nor intrusive 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
Choose the options which better reflects your opinions.  
 Click 1 if you think that smartphone location tracking is useful and not very 
intrusive 
 Click 2 if you think that smartphone location tracking is useful but highly 
intrusive 
 Click 3 if you think that smartphone location tracking is useless and highly 
intrusive 
 Click 4 if you think that smartphone location tracking is neither useful nor 
intrusive 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
XX. This is the final question about [the corresponding SOST]. Again there are five choices of 
answer. 
 If you strongly agree with the statement, click 1 
 If you agree with the statement, click 2 
 If you neither agree nor disagree with the statement, click 3 
 If you disagree with the statement, click 4 
 If you strongly disagree with the statement, click 5 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
56. Overall I support the adoption of Smart CCTV as a national security measure. 
57. Overall I support the adoption of Deep Packet Inspection as a national security measure. 
Overall I support the adoption of Smartphone Location Tracking as a national security 
measure. 
GENERAL ATTITUDES OF THE PARTICIPANTS 
(END OF SOST SPECIFIC SESSIONS) 
XXI. Finally, we’re going to show you some general statements about security, privacy and 
surveillance oriented security technologies. For the following statements, there are five 
answers to choose from.  
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 If you agree with the statement, click 2 
 If you neither agree nor disagree with the statement, click 3 
 If you disagree with the statement, click 4 
 If you strongly disagree with the statement, click 5 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
58. The use of surveillance-oriented security technologies improves national security. 
59. Surveillance-oriented security technologies are only used to show that something is 
being done to fight crime. 
60. If you have done nothing wrong you do not have to worry about surveillance-oriented 
security technologies. 
61. If surveillance-oriented security technology is available national governments might as 
well make use of it. 
62. Once security technologies are in place they are likely to be abused. 
XXII. Here are four general statements about privacy. As with the previous question, there are five 
answers to choose from. 
 If you strongly agree with the statement, click 1 
 If you agree with the statement, click 2 
 If you neither agree nor disagree with the statement, click 3 
 If you disagree with the statement, click 4 
 If you strongly disagree with the statement, click 5 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
63. I am concerned that too much information is collected about me. 
64. I am concerned information held about me may be inaccurate.  
65. I am concerned that my personal information may be shared without my permission. 
66. I am concerned that my personal information may be used against me. 
XXIII. Now we’d like to ask you about your knowledge of these issues after attending this event. 
There are four possible responses. 
67. After watching the SurPRISE films, discussing with fellow participants and reading the 
information booklet how would you rate your knowledge of surveillance oriented 
security technologies? 
 Click 1 for ‘I am very knowledgeable’ 
 Click 2 for ‘I know a good amount but it would be useful to learn more’ 
 Click 3 for ‘I have some knowledge of surveillance-oriented security 
technologies ’ 
 Click 4 for ‘I know little to nothing about surveillance-oriented security 
technologies’ 
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XXIV. Just two more questions to go before we ask for some final information about you! This one 
is about your views on security technologies and privacy.  
XXV. A surveillance-oriented security technology is a technology which uses information 
gathered about the general population and their activities in order to tackle a security 
problem. 
XXVI. Privacy refers to the ability of an individual to be left alone, out of public view, and in 
control of information about oneself. 
XXVII. We define security as the condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; a 
feeling of safety or freedom from or absence of danger. 
Again there are 5 possible responses and you need to choose one.  
 If you strongly agree with the statement, click 1 
 If you agree with the statement, click 2 
 If you neither agree nor disagree with the statement, click 3 
 If you disagree with the statement, click 4 
 If you strongly disagree with the statement, click 5 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
68. Overall I believe surveillance-oriented security technologies should be routinely 
implemented to improve national security. 
69. I am concerned that the use of surveillance-oriented security technologies is eroding my 
privacy. 
70. I am concerned that the use of surveillance-oriented security technologies is eroding 
privacy in general. 
XXVIII. In the information magazine we talked about alternative approaches to security which did 
not involve using security technologies. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with 
the following statement. Again there are 5 possible responses and you need to choose one.  
 If you strongly agree with the statement, click 1 
 If you agree with the statement, click 2 
 If you neither agree nor disagree with the statement, click 3 
 If you disagree with the statement, click 4 
 If you strongly disagree with the statement, click 5 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
71. Alternative approaches to security which do not involve surveillance oriented security 
technologies should be given higher priority. 
XXIX. To conclude we would like to ask a bit more about you. Please remember that none of your 
responses here can be traced to you personally as your clicker was chosen at random.  
72. Do you have children at home aged 16 or under?  
 Click 1 for ‘Yes’ 
 Click 2 for ‘No’ 
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73. Where do you live?  
 Click 1 for ’I live in a metropolitan area’ (e.g. a large city) 
 Click 2 for ’I live in an urban area’ (e.g. a medium sized city or town) 
 Click 3 for ‘I live in a rural area’ (e.g. a small town or village) 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
74. What is your highest level of formal education? 
 Click 1 for ‘Primary school’ 
 Click 2 for ‘Lower secondary’ 
 Click 3 for ‘Upper secondary’ 
 Click 4 for ‘Vocational qualification’ 
 Click 5 for ‘University – undergraduate’ 
 Click 6 for ‘University – postgraduate’ 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
75. Which of the following best describes your employment status? Select the number which 
most accurately describes your current situation: 
 Click 1 for ‘Employed’ 
 Click 2 ‘Self-employed’ 
 Click 3 ‘Unemployed’ 
 Click 4 ‘Stay-at-home parent or carer’ 
 Click 5 ‘Student’ 
 Click 6 ‘Retired’ 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
76. If you are currently employed, self-employed or have been employed, which of the 
following best describes your occupation? 
 Click 1 for ‘Manager, legislator or senior official’ (for example, in a private 
company, the public sector or government) 
 Click 2 for ‘Professional’ (for example, in IT, law, health, education or business) 
 Click 3 for ‘Technicians and associated professionals’ (for example, in IT, law, 
health, education or business) 
 Click 4 for ‘Clerical support worker’ (for example, customer services, secretarial 
or accounting work) 
 Click 5 for ‘Services and sales worker’ (for example, in personal services, care, 
security or sales) 
 Click 6 for ‘Skilled agricultural, fisheries or forestry worker’ (for example, either 
selling to market or for subsistence) 
 Click 7 for ‘Craft and related trades-person’ (for example, building related 
trades, metal working, electrical, handicrafts and other artisan work) 
 Click 8 for ‘Plant and machine operator or assembler’ (for example, driving 
heavy machinery or performing assembly work) 
 Click 9 for ‘Elementary worker’ (for example, cleaning, general labouring, 
refuse collection) 
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 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
77. How well would you say you are managing financially these days? 
 Click 1 for ‘I’m doing very well’ 
 Click 2 for ‘I’m doing moderately well’ 
 Click 3 for ‘I’m just about getting by’ 
 Click 3 for ‘I’m finding it quite difficult’ 
 Click 4 for ‘I’m finding it very difficult’ 
 If you do not know or do not want to answer, click 0 
78. How would you characterise your citizenship?  
 Click 1 for ‘I am a [Local nationality] citizen’ 
 Click 2 for ‘I am a citizen of another European country’ 
 Click 3 for ‘I am a citizen of a non-European country’ 
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